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Abstract 
Subjective risks of having contaminated apples elicited via the Exchangeability 
Method (EM) are examined in this study. In particular, as the experimental design 
allows us to investigate the validity of elicited risk measures, we examine the magnitude 
of differences between valid and invalid observations. In addition, using an econometric 
model, we also explore the effect of consumers’ socioeconomic status and attitudes 
toward food safety on subjects’ perceptions of pesticide residues in apples. Results 
suggest first, that consumers do not expect an increase in the number of apples 
containing only one pesticide residue, but, rather, in the number of those apples with 
traces of multiple residues. Second, we find that valid subjective risk measures do not 
significantly diverge from invalid ones, indicative of little effect of internal validity on 
the actual magnitude of subjective risks. Finally, we show that subjective risks depend 
on age, education, a subject’s ties to the apple industry, and consumer association 
membership. 
 
Highlights 
• Subjects think that apples containing multiple residues will increase in the future  
• Valid subjective risks do not statistically diverge from those of invalid ones 
• Subjective risks depend on socioeconomic and attitudinal variables  
 
Keywords: subjective risks, internal validity, pesticide residue, apple.  
 
JEL: C91, D81, I10, Q10   
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How many bad apples are in a bunch? An experimental investigation of perceived 
pesticide residue risks  
 
1. Introduction 
Despite progress that international and national authorities have made toward 
ensuring food safety (e.g., food-labeling, packaging, inspections), food-related risks still 
get the attention of a substantial proportion of consumers. For example, approximately 
30 percent of all Europeans remain concerned about health consequences of pesticide 
residues in food (European Commission, 2010).  
As both short- and long-term health outcomes induced by food safety are often 
uncertain, people’s own risk estimates become crucial for understanding their choice-
behavior towards food products or policies (Kivi and Shogren, 2010)1. In fact, several 
empirical investigations have shown that subjective risks often dictate consumers’ 
choices far more than science-based risk predictions would, especially when subjective 
estimates differ from science-based ones (e.g., Jakus et al., 2009). There might be two 
general reasons why such a discrepancy exists. First, while science-based risk estimates 
are simple averages based on frequency values for homogenous populations, individual 
subjective risks are heterogeneous, and causes for this heterogeneity can be observed or 
unobserved. For many individuals, their subjective risks might be accurate, and not truly 
equal to the average population risk. Second, some individuals may make mistakes in 
processing risk-related information, and formulate estimates that are higher or lower 
than the science-based predictions. Much of what economists know about subjective 
risks has been borrowed from initial work by psychologists (e.g., Slovic, 1987). 
Although an extensive literature has shown that subjective risks related to 
financial outcomes affect people’s choices in several branches of applied economics 
                                                          
1
 Here, risk is intended to mean the probability that a given outcome occurs. 
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(see Manski, 2004 for a review), a relatively small number of studies have investigated 
the influence that subjective risks related to health outcomes have on people’s behavior 
related to their everyday choices. A few studies have primarily coped with estimates of 
health risks related to smoking behavior (e.g., Viscusi, 1990; Gerking and Khaddaria, 
2011) as well as drinking contaminated water (e.g., Jakus et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 
2012). Unfortunately, little has been done to investigate whether subjective health risks 
related to food safety affect people’s economic choices in their everyday life.  A 
relatively small number of studies have shown that consumers’ numerical estimates of 
health risks (i.e., mortality rate) due to the presence of pesticide residues in fresh fruit 
and vegetables drive their preferences for pesticide-free fresh fruit and vegetables in 
hypothetical markets (e.g., Hammit, 1990; van Ravenswaay and Hoehn, 1991; Buzby et 
al., 1998).  
In contrast to other studies, here we mainly examine the risk of having 
contaminated apples. In particular, we investigate consumers’ subjective probabilities 
that given proportions of apples produced in the Province of Trento (Italy) will contain 
pesticide residues in the future. Given that pesticide residues have consequences on 
health, consumers’ expectations about the future presence of pesticide residues in apples 
likely affect their support for an agricultural policy that the Province of Trento is 
planning to incentivize the production of pesticide-free apples. The investigation of 
consumers’ preferences for this policy becomes particularly important because the 
saleable gross production of apple is approximately 23 percent of the entire agricultural 
saleable gross production in the Province of Trento (P.A.T., 2010). 
5 
 
The bulk of the literature which has investigated subjective risks related to food 
safety has barely taken into account the fact that elicited risks might not be valid2. An 
exception is the artefactual field experiment conducted by Cerroni et al. (2012) in which 
the validity of subjective risks elicited via the Exchangeability Method (EM) (Baillon, 
2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2011), an innovative elicitation techniques based on the notion 
of exchangeable events (de Finetti, 1937), has been tested. In this study, the validation 
procedure is based on the de Finetti’s notion of coherence under which risk estimates 
are coherent if and only if they obey to all axioms and theorems of Probability Theory 
(de Finetti 1937; 1974a; 1974b).  
Investigating the validity of subjective risks contributes to better understand 
people’s choices under risk and uncertainty. In fact, the inclusion of invalid 
observations in subjective expected utility or other non-expected utility models used to 
predict decision-making processes might generate biased results, especially if invalid 
observations systematically differ from valid ones in terms of magnitude. For example, 
if invalid subjective risks are systematically lower (or greater) then valid ones, 
consumers’ willingness to support agricultural policies might be underestimated (or 
overestimated).  
Given that, in this current paper, by drawing on Cerroni et al.’s (2012) results on 
the validity of subjective risks elicited via the EM, we more carefully analyze the actual 
discrepancy between valid and invalid risk estimates. In other words, we measure the 
differences in terms of magnitude, which goes beyond the previous study. Furthermore, 
we also econometrically identify attitudinal and socio-economic factors that shape 
subject’s perceptions, comparing our results with previous findings. 
                                                          
2
 In contrast, one might use observed purchases or transactions as a way of revealing individuals’ sense of 
risk, but identification issues may easily arise in the effort to uncover the risks and sort these out from 
other influences on purchases. 
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 The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In the next section, we review 
previous studies dealing with perceptions of pesticide residues and its consequences on 
human health. Next, we define the aims of the current study and provide detailed 
information about the experimental design. Finally, we offer a discussion of our results.  
 
2. Subjective risks and pesticide residues 
Many stated-preference (SP) studies have investigated the role of consumers’ 
perceptions of health outcomes due to pesticide residues in determining food-
purchasing behavior. In general, these studies have shown a negative correlation 
between people’s perceptions of health outcomes due to pesticide residues and 
willingness to purchase products which contain those chemical substances. Many food 
products have been considered, ranging from general unlabeled ones (e.g., Misra, et al., 
1991; Eom, 1994; Rimal, et al. 2008) to specific types of fresh fruit and vegetables (e.g., 
Fu et al., 1999; Boccaletti and Nardella, 2000). 
Most previous studies have not focused on subjective risk estimates expressed in a 
numerical fashion, but on people’s concern about the severity of health consequences 
due to food safety. For example, individuals have been asked to indicate the presence of 
health risks using simple descriptive labels (e.g. high, medium, or low), likert or other 
numerical scales.  
Eom (1994) has elicited subjects’ concern about the presence of pesticides in 
general commercially grown food products by using a likert scale between 0 (no risk) 
and 10 (very serious risk). This study has found that the average concern across 
consumers was quite high, around 6.6. The same approach was taken by Fu et al. 
(1999), but for fresh fruit and vegetables. In this case, the average level of concern was 
extremely high, exceeding 6, on a scale between 0 and 7. In their experimental auction 
for residue-free foods, Roosen et al. (1998) have used a simple scale of concern (1 to 5) 
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to investigate the influence of subjective perceptions on consumers’ bidding behavior. 
The approach recently used by Rimal et al. (2008) to elicit people’s perceptions of 
pesticide residues in food was even simpler. In fact, individuals were simply asked to 
state whether the problem of pesticides in food was serious, moderate or inexistent, and 
the finding was that more than half the subjects chose the serious option.  
Boccaletti and Nardella (2000) have improved the approach used by Misra et al. 
(1991) implementing a Likert Attitude Scaling Procedure, where individuals are asked 
several questions and, then, an individual-specific score is calculated to measure the 
concern about pesticide residues on fresh fruit and vegetables. The mean score across 
consumers was 78 on the maximum of 100, where the latter value is not a probability 
per se, but simply indicates very high concern.  
Several scholars have questioned whether perceptions measured on some scale, as 
done in some of the studies above, are good indicators of risk (e.g., Viscusi and Hakes, 
2003). At the very least, one would have to make strong assumptions to re-map from a 0 
to 10 discrete response scale to a 0 to 1 unit interval. This could be done for example, to 
get a relevant risk measure, which is of course a continuous variable on the unit interval. 
Simple recoding would of course make it impossible to obtain other risk estimates than 
in 10 percent jumps (10, 20, 30 percent etc.). 
While these simple efforts are appealing, they are lacking in that they do not 
provide the information that would be ideal in actual modelling risky behaviours. In 
fact, measures of concern, or other responses which are not numerical measure cannot 
be directly used in either an expected utility or subjective expected utility framework, 
(Manski, 2004). Hence, many other studies have paid closer attention to the elicitation 
of actual numerical risk measures. In most of these studies the elicitation scheme is 
simple, and people are just asked to state risk estimates. The specific magnitude of the 
outcome that will happen is typically first presented, and individuals are then asked 
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about the probability of this occurring to others (e.g., Viscusi 1990, asked people to 
guess how many smokers out of 100 will get, or die from, lung cancer), or to 
themselves, but many variations in presentation are possible. The techniques which 
directly elicit subjective risks are called direct methods (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 
1975). 
Extensive research, much of which is in the psychology literature, has shown that 
people do not easily understand numerical risks (especially small ones), and, given that, 
has suggested different approaches (i.e., frequencies) for making people willing and 
able to state their best estimates (e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Hammit and 
Graham, 1999; Corso et al., 2001).  
Several studies have shown that mortality risks be couched as deaths per 100,000 
or some other number in the population, avoiding small decimal place numbers that are 
confusing. Buzby et al. (1998) have asked subjects their own subjective probability of 
dying from consuming fresh products containing pesticides in a similar manner, 
specifically, as the annual number of deaths per 1 million individuals. Since this 
probability-estimation task may be difficult for laypeople, subjects in both of these 
studies were provided with risk ladders showing probability of dying from more-
familiar causes of death. The mean probability estimate was roughly 43 deaths per 
million in the population, per year.  
Williams and Hammit (2001) have used this same basic technique to examine the 
annual fatality rate per 1 million in the population of the United States for several 
categories of food hazards, and one of these was also the presence of pesticide residues 
in food. Generally, consumers perceived the probability of dying due to pesticides as 
being greater than that related to either natural toxins or microbial pathogens. In 
particular, to conventional buyers, the annual median fatality rate because of pesticide 
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residues on fresh products was 50 per million, while, to organic food buyers, the rate 
was 200 per million. 
Although direct methods are very easy to design and implement, they have been 
questioned because of the quality or accuracy of the elicited subjective risks. In the 
cognitive psychology literature the ability, or more specifically, the willingness of 
subjects to put efforts in expressing their belief in numerical risk estimates, has been 
extensively debated. The elicitation of numerical risks is of course easy and feasible, but 
reliable results are not guaranteed (Manski, 2004).  
An alternative way of eliciting subjective risks consists of using subjects’ choices, 
most often made over lotteries and gambles. In particular, risk measures are indirectly 
estimated by the researcher at the points for which people show their indifference 
between lotteries or gambles, which can be thought of as games that the subjects play. 
These techniques which indirectly elicit subjective risks are called indirect methods 
(Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). Those methods are assumed to be less demanding 
than direct methods from a cognitive point of view as subjects are not asked to directly 
express a numerical risk, but to compare risky outcomes and choose the most likely one 
(Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975).  
To our knowledge, the first application of an indirect technique in eliciting 
subjective risks of having pesticide residues in food is represented by the Cerroni et al. 
(2012)’s artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). In particular, that study 
has elicited numerical subjective probabilities that given proportions of apples will 
contain pesticide residues by using the EM. This technique consists of a set of binary 
questions in which subjects are asked to bet a given amount of money on a given 
outcome rather than on an alternative one. Subjective risks are indirectly inferred at the 
point for which subjects show their indifference for betting on one of the two outcomes.  
The fact that the outcomes derive from a bisection procedure of the whole state space of 
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the random variable under study, make binary questions chained, in the sense that the 
outcomes presented in one questions depend on the outcome that has been chosen in the 
previous question. One innovative aspect of this elicitation technique consists in asking 
subjects to focus on the severity of the outcome under study, rather than on the 
probability of a given outcome to occur. This investigation into outcomes is rare, as 
compared to attention paid by previous studies to subjective probabilities of endpoint 
risks, such as human mortality or morbidity rates (Kuhn and Budescu, 1996). 
The study by Cerroni et al. (2012) also represents the first attempt to investigate 
the influence that incentive compatibility has on the internal validity of elicited 
subjective risks related to food safety outcomes. In fact, when monetary incentive are 
provided to subjects based on their betting behavior, chained elicitation mechanism 
such as the EM are presumed to induce subjects to not state their real beliefs, but to 
strategically behave to get better rewarded.  To test whether internal validity of elicited 
subjective risk estimates depends on incentive compatibility four experimental 
treatments have been designed. More specifically, subjects were provided with 
monetary incentives in two treatments, but they were not in the remaining two. Each of 
these treatments was divided into two other treatment, in one treatment, subjects were 
aware of the chained structure of the EM because questions were sequentially ordered, 
while in the other treatment, subjects were not aware of method as questions were 
randomly ordered. A detailed description of treatment groups will be provided below.  
As noted above, valid estimates have been identified by using a validation 
procedure based on the de Finetti’s notion of coherent subjective probabilities (de 
Finetti, 1937; 1974a; 1974b). In particular, risk measures elicited via the EM are valid if 
and only if the certainty equivalents that subjects are asked to express about specific 
lotteries are equal. These lotteries involve the two risky outcomes that subjects were 
indifferent between during the EM procedure. In the EM framework, this ensures that 
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subjective risks satisfy de Finetti’s notion of coherence. Certainty equivalents were 
elicited by using another experimental game which will be described in more details 
below, the Certainty Equivalent Game (CEG). 
Investigating the validity within each treatment group, Cerroni et al. (2012) have 
found that subjects provided with real monetary incentives and random questions more 
likely return valid estimates. Examining the validity of each elicited subjective risk 
estimates, they found that the proportion of valid estimates is 29.72 percent in the 
sample. In particular, they showed that the proportion of valid subjective risks is 39.13 
percent when real monetary incentives and random questions were provided to subjects, 
followed by 29.86 percent when monetary incentives were not provided and questions 
were randomly ordered, 26.26 percent when real monetary incentives were provided, 
but questions were sequentially ordered, and 22.22 percent when monetary incentives 
were not provided and questions were sequentially ordered. This suggests that in each 
treatment group there is a relatively small portion of valid subjective risk estimates, and 
the real compensation with sequential responses out-performs the other treatments.  
In our view, as subjective risks are often incorporated in the standard subjective 
expected utility or other non-standard theories of decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty to model and predict behavior, the identification of valid risk estimates 
becomes crucial to obtain highly predictive models, and thus, reliable findings on 
subjects’ choice behavior. This is particularly true if valid observations systematically 
differ from invalid ones in terms of magnitude. In the latter case, failure to recognize 
valid subjective risks might induce us to over- or underestimate subjects’ true 
expectations, and hence, to wrongly predicts their behavior. 
 
3. Objectives 
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By drawing on Cerroni et al.’s (2012) investigation and using the same dataset 
they have used in their analysis, we first investigate subjective risks of having 
contaminated apples. Second, we examine the potential discrepancy between valid and 
invalid subjective risks to fully understand whether failure to recognize validity implies 
an over- or underestimation of consumers’ true probability estimates. Finally, we 
estimate a behavioral model to identify attitudinal and socio-economic factors that 
affect the subject’s risk estimates of pesticide residues in apples. This information will 
help policy makers to target their risk communication campaigns at given interest 
groups of  the population and, hence, gain public support for the Province of Trento’s 
pesticide risk reduction policy.  
 
4. The empirical application 
4.1. The case study 
The fire blight is a bacterial disease that has damaged and killed apple plants in 
the Province of Trento since 2003 (EMF, 2006). The current infestation rate which is 
the number of days in which the infestation occurs in the blossoming period is less than 
1 percent. The infestation rate depends on climatic parameters such us temperature and 
precipitation. In this region of Italy, farmers currently adopt preventative measures 
based on pesticide usage in the form of copper compounds or Acibenzolar-S-metile to 
control the mild negative consequences that fire blight has on apple production. 
However, the future increase of the infestation rate, which is predicted to reach 17 
percent in 2030, might eventually induce farmers to use new pesticides for preventative 
and curative control of fire blight. One candidate is the antibiotic streptomycin, 
currently forbidden under Italian law, but which has been already used in U.S., 
Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands to control fire blight (Németh, 2004).  
 
13 
 
4.2. The sample and the dataset 
The pool of sample subjects is the same used by Cerroni et al. (2012) and consists 
of 80 individuals between 18 and 70 years age who live in the Province of Trento. The 
sample is not, strictly speaking, randomly selected because subjects were recruited 
outside food markets, but it is still quite generally representative of people living in this 
Province because most of the people in the region go shopping in those markets at some 
point or another. A show-up fee of €25 was given to each participant as a compensation 
for agreeing to come into the experimental lab of the University of Trento to take part in 
the experiment. 
The dataset consists of 1,200 probability estimates, 400 for each of the three 
random variables under study which are: the number of apples, a, containing at least 
one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 20303, the number of apples, r, containing at 
least two residues (multiple residues) in a sample of 100 apples in 20304, and the 
number of days, g, during which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period 
in 20305. The latter variable g was added because of the potential link between the 
development of fire blight and the presence of pesticide residues in apples. For each 
random variable, five risk estimates have been elicited from each subjects, the lower 
bound (g0, a0, and r0), the 25th percentile (g1/4, a1/4, and r1/4), the 50th percentile (g1/2, a1/2, 
and r1/2), the 75th percentile (g3/4, a3/4, and r3/4), and the upper bound (g1, a1, and r1).  
These variables were selected after having interviewed approximately 20 focus 
group subjects. The year 2030 is chosen because the best available science predicts that 
the heavy development of new phytopathology, as the fire blight, will start 
approximately twenty years from now in the Province of Trento.   
 
                                                          
3
 The apple containing residues are those containing at least one residue beyond the level of 0 mg/kg. 
4
 The apple containing residues are those containing at least two residues beyond the level of 0 mg/kg. 
5
 The blossoming period usually occurs in April in the Province of Trento. 
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4.3. Experimental Treatments 
As noted above, selected sample participants were randomly assigned to four 
treatment groups. Each subsample is presented with a different experimental design: the 
real monetary incentives-sequential questions with 23 subjects (TRS), the real monetary 
incentives-random questions with 22 subjects (TRR), the hypothetical monetary 
incentives-sequential questions with 16 subjects (THS), and the hypothetical monetary 
incentives-random questions with 19 subjects (THR).  
In the hypothetical treatments (THR and THS), subjects are only given the show-
up fee, while in the real incentives treatments (TRR and TRS), each subject has the 
chance to win up to an additional €100 based on their choices during the experimental 
games. More specifically, one randomly selected individual from each group (TRR and 
TRS) can actually earn additional €100 based on her/his choices during the experiment. 
The subject to be paid is randomly selected at the end of the experiment by drawing a 
numbered chip from a bingo cage (Cage 1). All subjects have the same equal chance of 
being the winner because the total number of chips in the bingo cage is equal to the total 
number of participants in each session and subjects are informed of this. One of the 
questions each subject answers during the experiment is also randomly selected to be 
played out for the payoff. In this case, we use another cage (Cage 2) that contains as 
many numbered chips as the number of questions that the respondent answered during 
the experiment. The selected participant wins the additional €100 if and only if the 
event she/he had chosen in the drawn question contains the value of the random variable 
under consideration that the Edmund Mach Foundation (EMF) predicts. Such science-
based predictions of risk have been frequently used by experimental researchers (for 
example, see Fiore et al., 2009). Of course, this specific incentive scheme may have 
induced subjects to guess the science-based estimated instead of expressing their own 
subjective risks. Subjects may have had private information about the science-based risk 
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estimates or some reason for not trusting the Edmund Mach Foundation’ s (EMF’s) 
studies and predictions6. We assume that subjects’ risk estimates have been not distorted  
away from their own beliefs  by our incentive scheme for two main reasons. First, our 
subjects are average consumers and are unlikely to have had any information about the 
science-based risk estimate because the latter had not been disseminated to the public 
when the experiment was conducted. 
In addition, based on our focus group interviews, we believe that the population of 
the Province of Trento highly trusts the EMF, and would have no reason to have a 
strongly different personal prior. In one question of the survey, subjects were asked to 
state their level of trust in the EMF on a scale between 0 (very low) and 4 (very high), 
and their average level of trust was around 2.6. None of the subjects expressed a very 
low level of trust and only 3 subjects out of 80 expressed a low level of trust. Given this 
information we do  not think elicitation to correspond with the EMF prediction is a large 
problem for the study. As noted by Baillon (2008) and echoed in Cerroni and Shaw 
(2012) the simplest strategy for consumers to play the game is just to state their real 
beliefs. In this context, we assume that our incentive scheme has induced subjects to 
state their real beliefs, or at least, to invest more cognitive effort into doing that (Cerroni 
et al., 2012). 
One feature of the sample worth noting is that we do have a few apple producers, 
and these subjects may indeed have more information than others do. However, their 
preferences do not influence average beliefs because there are so few of them (3 out of 
80).  
The only difference between the random (THR and TRR) and sequential 
treatments (THS and TRS) is the order of the questions. In fact, in sequential treatments 
subjects are presented with sequentially ordered questions, and, hence, they are aware of 
                                                          
6
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
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the chained structure of the EM, while, in the random treatments, subjects face 
randomly ordered questions which hide the presence of chained questions. More 
precisely, in the sequential treatments, the order in which percentiles of each subject’s 
CDF are elicited is the following: g1/2, g1/4, g3/4, a1/2, a1/4, a3/4, r1/2, r1/4, and r3/4. In the 
random treatments, the order in which the percentiles of each subject’s CDF are elicited 
is the following: g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4, a3/4, and  r3/4. 
 
5. Methods 
5.1. The elicitation of subjective risks: the Exchangeability Method 
In this section, we briefly describe the EM, the technique used by Cerroni et al. 
(2012) to elicit subjective risks. The EM consists of multiple binary questions where 
subjects are only asked to bet a certain amount of money on one of the two disjoint 
subspaces in which the whole state space of the variable under study has been 
previously divided based on their choices. When subjects become indifferent to bet on 
one disjoint subspace rather than on the other, they are assumed to perceive those 
subspaces as equally likely (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). This method allows 
eliciting several point estimates of the individual cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of the random variable under study for each experimental subject. Interested 
readers may find additional details about the EM in Abdellaoui et al. (2011), Baillon 
(2008), and Cerroni and Shaw (2012).  
The EM is applied to elicit risks of three random variables, a, r, and g. As the EM 
is formally described in Cerroni et al. (2012), for brevity’s sake, here, we only describe 
the application of the EM that concerns the number of apples containing at least one 
residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (variable a). At the beginning of the game, 
subjects are asked to express the lower (a0) and upper bounds (a1) of the event space A. 
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In this way, the individual-specific range outside of which subjects are essentially 
certain that the outcome cannot happen at all is identified. Assume that subject i states 
that a0 is equal to 60 apples and a1 is equal to 76. This means that she/he believes that 
the probability that the portion of apples containing at least one pesticide residue in 
2030 will be outside these bounds (i.e. less than 60 and greater than 76) is equal to zero.  
The second step involves asking a series of questions to establish the value of 
a1/2 that corresponds with the 50th percentile of the subjective CDF, the median 
estimate. The first binary question is generated by splitting the event space in two 
prospects by using the following algorithm, 60 + [(76
 
- 60)/2] = 68. It follows that the 
first binary question implies a choice between prospects A1={60<x<68} and A2={68≤x< 
76} (Figure 1). Following the first choice, the exercise is repeated using a bisection of 
the chosen prospect. For example, if subject i has chosen prospect A1={60<x<68}, the 
second binary question asks subjects to choose between prospects A3={60<x<64} and 
A4={64≤x<68}. The bisectioning process goes on until the subjects become indifferent 
between the two prospects; at this point, the median point a1/2 of each subject’s CDF is 
estimated. This estimate indicates that there is a 50 percent chance that the number of 
apples that will contain at least one pesticide residue in 2030 will be equal to or less 
than a1/2. A similar process can be followed to determine as many other points for the 
individual’s subjective CDF as is desired, depending on limitations of the subjects’ 
attention spans. Here, the 25th percentile (a1/4) and the 75th percentile (a3/4) are also 
elicited. Before asking our subjects to play the EM, they were provided with a 
description of the relevant scenario, as well as precise information about the values that 
the random variables under study had in the last ten years (from 2000 to 2009),  
 
5.2. The validity of subjective risks: the Certainty Equivalent Game  
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In this section, we briefly describe an additional experimental game that was 
implemented by Cerroni et al. (2012) to facilitate the identification of valid risk 
measures, the Certainty Equivalent Game (CEG)7. In the CEG, subjects are presented 
with two choice tasks, say CT1 and CT2, both containing six binary questions, each 
asking subjects to choose between a gamble and a certain amount of money (Figure 2).  
Next, we provide an example of the CEG that concerns the number of apples 
containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (variable a). Assume 
that subject i provides us with an estimate of a1/2 that is equal to 66 apples, in CT1 
she/he has to choose between options A (place a bet of  € x  on the fact that a is lower 
than 66) or B (take the certain amount of money z = 0, 25, 49, 51, 75, and €100). For the 
second choice task CT2, she/he has to choose between options A (a bet of € x on the 
fact that a is greater than or equal to 66) or B (take the amount of money z = 0, 25, 49, 
51, 75, and €100). The certainty equivalent for the lottery described in option A is 
determined by looking at the first question of the six in the choice task in which the 
subject switches from choosing option A to choose option B (the amount of money). 
The CEG is played for the 25th percentile (g1/4, a1/4, and r1/4), the 50th percentile (g1/2, 
a1/2, and r1/2), and the 75th percentile (g3/4, a3/4, and r3/4). The CEG allows identification 
of valid risk estimates at both the sample and individual level. In the former case, the 
sample provides valid risks if and only if CE estimates related to CT1 and CT2 does not 
statistically differ from each other. At the individual level, each specific risk estimate is 
valid if and only if the CE estimates related to CT1 and CT2 are equal.  
 
6. Results 
6.1. The analysis of subjective risks 
                                                          
7
 Cerroni et al. (2012) tested also the reliability of elicited risk estimates via the EM by implementing the 
Repeated Exchangeability Game. However, here, we only focus on the validity and, hence, the CEG is 
taken into account. 
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On average, estimated bounds of variable a suggest that the subjects believe the 
number of contaminated apples out of 100 will be between 56 and 75. Using 
information from the estimated 25th percentile, we argue that subjects believe there is 
only a 25 percent chance that the number of apples containing pesticides will be lower 
than or equal to 66. Using average values for the 50th and the 75th percentiles it appears 
that the subjects attach a 50 percent chance to the fact that the number of bad apples will 
be lower than or equal to 69, and 75 percent chance to the fact that this number will be 
lower than or equal to 71 apples (see the basic statistics in Table 1 and Figure 3). 
Taking into account that the number of apples with at least one pesticide residue at 
present (in 2009) is 63 out of 100 (Italian Ministry of Health, 2010), we conclude that 
subjects do not in fact perceive an increase in the number of apples containing at least 
one pesticide residue by the year 2030 to be particularly substantial and, very likely.  
Following the same general approach, we interpret percentile estimates related of 
the r variable, which is the number of apples containing multiple residues in a sample of 
100 apples in 2030. In this case, we found that the lower bound (r0) is about 31, the 25th 
percentile (r1/4) is 42, the 50th percentile (r1/2) is 45, the 75th percentile (r3/4) is 48, and 
the upper bound (r1) is 52 (again, see Table 1 and Figure 3). As might be expected, the 
average percentile estimates of r are always smaller than those of variable a (Figure 3) 
because the number of apples with multiple residues should always be lower than the 
number of apples with at least one residue. However, given that 31 apples, out of the 63 
containing at least one residue, have multiple residues in 2009 (Italian Ministry of 
Health, 2010), we deduce that subjects perceive an increase in the number of apples 
with multiple residues to be quite significant and likely. For example, they think that 
there is 75 percent chance that the number of apples with multiple residues will be 48 at 
the worst. 
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To summarize, although subjects believe that the number of apples containing one 
residue or more will not significantly increase by the year 2030, they predict that the 
number of apples containing multiple residues (more than one) will significantly 
increase. This means that the number of apples containing only one pesticide residue 
will decrease, but the number of apples with multiple residues will significantly grow 
by the year 2030.  
Considering the infestation rate which is the number of days in which the 
infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030, we found that the lower 
bound (g0) is 6, the 25th percentile (g1/4) is 8, the 50th percentile (g1/2) is 9, the 75th 
percentile (g3/4) is 10, and the upper bound (g1) is 12 (see Table 1 and Figure 4). Given 
the fact that the number of days in which the infestation actually occurred in 2000, 
2005, and 2010 was very close to zero, we conclude that subjects perceive the 
infestation rate in 2030 as being quite high and likely. 
 
6.2. The difference between valid and invalid subjective risks 
Using results on validity obtained by Cerroni et al. (2012) via the Certainty 
Equivalent Game, for each random variable, we compare the magnitudes of valid and 
invalid estimates at both the sample and individual levels. At the sample level, we found 
here that the valid estimates are lower than invalid ones for each percentile (the 25th, the 
50th, and the 75th) of each variable (a, r, and g) (Table 2). However, by using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Mann-Whitney U (MWU) tests, we found that the 
discrepancy between the magnitudes of valid and invalid estimates is not statistically 
significant for all variables, a, g, and r (Table 3). Hence, even if our results suggest that 
failure to recognize validity might induce researchers to overestimate subjects’ true risk 
estimates, this finding is not statistically supported.  
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Next, the valid and invalid estimates are compared at the individual level. For the 
random variables a and r, we found the same pattern as before, the 25th, the 50th, and the 
75th percentiles are lower in valid estimates as compared to invalid ones (Table 2). 
Using the KS and MWU tests, we found that such a discrepancy between valid and 
invalid estimates is not statistically supported for variable a, while it is for variable r. In 
particular, valid estimates of 25th percentile (r1/4) are statistically lower than the 
corresponding invalid ones (Table 4).  
We found a different pattern for the variable g; valid estimates of the 25th and 75th 
percentiles (g1/4 and g3/4) are greater than the corresponding invalid estimates, while 
valid estimates of the 50th percentile (g1/2) are lower than invalid ones (see columns 3 
and 4 in Table 2). However, these results are not statistically supported by the KS and 
MWU tests (Table 4).   
In general, the valid estimates are smaller than the invalid ones in variable a and r, 
but greater in variable g. However, we note that such discrepancies are statistically 
supported only for variable r, but not for a and g. For what concern r, mistakes appear 
here to result in upward bias, and thus, failure to recognize validity results in an 
overestimation of subjects’ average probabilistic expectations. 
 
6.3. Factors shaping subjective risks 
To further analyze the factors that explain subjects’ probabilistic expectations of 
both the number of apples containing pesticide residues and the fire blight’s infestation 
rate, we estimate three empirical models (see Table 5 for the definition of the 
explanatory variables used in the econometric model).  
Given that our dependent variables are all essentially fractions, we do not estimate 
our models (Model 1, 2, and 3) by using a simple OLS estimator, although many apply 
the linear probability model to such data. Here, we use the Generalized Linear Model 
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(GLM) along with robust standard errors (Papke and Woolridge, 1996). Observations in 
80 groups are clustered because each subject provides three different percentile 
estimates (25th, 50th, and 75th percentile) for each random variable under study (g, a, and 
r), and these may be correlated.  
The general empirical specification common to the three models is: 
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In Model 1, the dependent variable (y) is each subject’s estimates of the number 
of days in which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030 (g), in 
Model 2, each subject’s estimates of the number of apples containing at least one 
residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (a), and in Model 3, each subject’s estimates 
of the number of apples containing multiple residues in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 
(r). 
In all models, we examine whether 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile estimates differ 
from each other by using the set of dummy variables PERCENTILE which consists of 
variable 25thPERC, 50thPERC, and 75thPERC . As we expected, the 50th and 75th 
percentile estimates (50thPERC and 75th PERC, respectively) are statistically greater 
than the 25th percentile estimates (25th PERC) at the 1 percent significance level (see 
Table 6).  
In addition, we investigate the difference between valid and invalid estimates in 
terms of magnitude by creating another variable, called VALIDITY, defined below. 
Cerroni et al. (2012) demonstrated that subjects were more likely express valid risk 
estimates when they were provided with monetary incentives and randomly ordered 
questions, but we actually compare the magnitude of risk measures elicited from 
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subjects who belong to the “real incentives-random questions” treatment (TRR) with 
risk estimates elicited from subjects who belong to the other treatments (TRS, THR, and 
THS). To accomplish this, the  VALIDITY variable is comprised of four dummy 
variables (TRS, TRR, THS, and THR), each taking a value equal to 1 if and only if the 
subjects belong to the experimental treatment that the variable represents, and equal to 
zero otherwise. 
Consider Model 2 (a) and 3 (r) in Table 6. The positive signs of variables TRS, 
THR, and THS’s coefficients are consistent with result from non-parametric testing 
which show that average invalid estimates are greater than valid ones. However, 
estimated coefficients are not statistically supported in either Model 2 (a) or Model 3 (r) 
(Table 6). In Model 1, we found that TRS’ coefficient has the expected positive sign, 
while THR and THS’s coefficients  are negative, meaning that invalid observation are 
lower than valid ones. However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant 
(Table 6).  
The composition of the vector ATTITUDE used to explain the random variable g 
strongly differs from that used to explain the other variables, a and r. For what concerns 
Model 1 (g), ATTITUDE captures subjects’ trust in the IPCC’s predictions about climate 
change (IPCC_AV, IPCC_HIGH, and IPCC_VHIGH) and their beliefs about the human 
and/or natural determinants of this phenomenon (CC_HN, CC_H, and CC_HH). In the 
former case, the subjects were informed about the positive correlation between the fire 
blight’s infestation rate and climatic conditions during the presentation of the 
experimental instructions, and we predict that subjects who highly trust the IPCC’ 
predictions (IPCC_HIGH and IPCC_VHIGH) will provide higher estimates of the 
number of days in which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 
2030 (g) than those who partially trust IPCC’ predictions (IPCC_AV). The coefficient of 
the variables IPCC_HIGH and IPCC_VHIGH have the positive and statistically 
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significant expected signs (Table 6). Our results also indicate that the subjects who 
believe that climate change is only due to human activities (CC_HH) perceive the 
infestation to be more likely than subjects who blame the climate change on both 
natural and human processes (CC_HN) (Table 6). The results, which are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, are consistent with some of the psychology literature 
about perceptions of risk, which has shown that people commonly perceive technology-
induced risks to be higher than nature-induced ones (e.g., Slovic, 1987). 
In Model 2 (a) and Model 3 (r), the variables relating to ATTITUDE captures 
subjects’ beliefs about the future usage of pesticides to control apple disease (PEST_AV, 
PEST_HIGH,  and PEST_VHIGH) and subjects’ trust in Edmund Mach Foundation’s 
predictions about the fire blight’s infestation rate (EMF _AV, EMF_HIGH, and 
EMF_VHIGH). As we expected, subjects who agree on the fact that farmers will mainly 
use pesticides in the future (PEST_HIGH and PEST_VHIGH) provide higher estimates 
of the number of apples that will contain residues than subjects who do not agree with 
that (PEST_LOW). However these results are not statistically significant in either Model 
3 (r) or Model 2 (a) (Table 6). 
Next, we hypothesize that subjects who trust the Edmund Mach Foundation’s 
predictions which show that the fire blight’s infestation rate will increase from the 1 
percent of 2010 to the 17 percent of 2030 (EMF_HIGH and EMF_VHIGH), have higher 
percentile estimates of the number of apples containing pesticide residues in 2030 than 
subjects who do not trust EMF’s predictions (EMF_LOW). This hypothesis is supported 
by some of the results, i.e., the positive and significant coefficients of the variables 
EMF_HIGH and EMF_VHIGH in Model 2 (a) at the 10 percent significance level, 
while it is not statistically supported in Model 3 (r) (Table 6). 
The APPLE_LINK variable vector, which consists of four diverse dummy 
variables, APP_PROD, APP_IND, CONSUMER, and CONS_ASS, is present in all 
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models. In Model 1 (g), subjects who produce apples (APP_PROD) provide lower 
estimates of the number of days in which the fire blight’s infestation will occur during 
the blossoming period in 2030 than the others (at the 5 percent significance level). This 
finding is not surprising because farmers have a better knowledge of the actual low 
infestation rate in the Province of Trento. As might be expected, farmers (APP_PROD) 
self-protect their own profession,  expressing lower estimates of the number of apples 
that will contain residues in 2030 than others, however, the negative coefficient of the 
variable APP_PROD is statistically significant in Model 3 (r), but not in Model 2 (a) 
(Table 6). 
In contrast to farmers, some subjects who work in apple processing and marketing 
(APP_IND) have generally higher estimates of pesticide residues in apples than others, 
and the positive coefficient is statistically significant in Model 2 and 3 at the 1 percent 
level (Table 6). This is likely due to the fact that people who are involved in the apple 
industry have better knowledge that chemicals are commonly used to control apple 
diseases than laypersons, but, unlike farmers, they do not appear to be interested in 
promoting a healthy brand image. 
While the fact that the number of apples consumed weekly (CONSUMER) does 
not affect estimates regarding the fire blight’s infestation rate (g) is perhaps not 
surprising, it is striking that this variable only partially influences the consumers’ 
perceptions of pesticide residues in apples (a and r). The variable CONSUMER is 
negative and statistically significant in Model 2 (a) at the 1 percentlevel, but it is not 
significant in Model 3 (r) (Table 6). The negative sign of this variable in Model 2 might 
be due to the fact that subjects who consume apples perceive the risk of contamination 
as low.  In contrast, we found that members of consumer associations (CONS_ASS) who 
are assumed to be very concerned about pesticide residues have higher estimates of both 
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a and r than the others (Table 6). The coefficient of this variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both Model 2 and Model 3.  
We have used the same set of socioeconomic variables in all our models. 
Although we found that women (FEMALE) have higher risk estimates, as frequently 
found in the literature about risk perceptions (e.g., Flynn et al., 1994; Krewski et al., 
1994; Lin, 1995; Hamilton, 1985; 1995), the coefficients are not statistically significant 
in all of our models.  
We found contrasting results for the age of subjects (AGE). A person’s age may 
serve as a proxy for experience with one or more types of risk. Related to the variable g 
(Model 1), we found that elderly subjects have higher estimates of the infestation rate 
than the others (at the 10 percent significance level). This result is consistent with the 
previous literature on age and health risks (e.g., Krewski et al., 1994; Williams and 
Hammit, 2001). In contrast however, we found that the number of apples containing 
pesticide residues decreases with age in Model 2 (a) and 3 (r) (5 and 1 percent 
significance level, respectively) (Table 6). This result may be due to the fact that 
younger consumers are expected to be more sensitive to food-safety issues than older 
ones because they are considering a longer period of life left  in front of them, but it is 
somewhat surprising because older consumers might be viewed to be more vulnerable 
to health risks than younger ones8.  
We also found some contrasting results about the effect of education on risk 
perception. Education is likely related to cognitive ability to process risk information, 
but might also relate to experience and general knowledge about health risks. Results 
based on Model 1 (g), support the hypothesis that more educated subjects 
(UNIVERSITY) have lower estimates of the infestation rate than the others 
                                                          
8
 As one anonymous referee argued, elderly subjects are more sensitive to food safety issues than younger 
ones because they more likely suffer chronic complications that put them at risk from food safety hazards. 
However, we note that as 2030 is quite far in the future, elderly subjects might not care much about these 
chronic complications.  
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(SEC_SCHOOL). This is consistent with what some others have found: see Dosman et 
al. (2001) and Williams and Hammit (2001). However, in Model 2 (a) and 3 (r), we 
found that people with a master degree have higher estimates of apples containing 
pesticides than people with lower education levels (5 and 1 percent significance level, 
respectively) (Table 6). Again, this divergence may be due to the fact that highly 
educated subjects (those with graduate degrees) may be more sensitive to food-safety 
issues than moderately educated subjects. 
Subjects with higher annual net income (INCOME) perceive the number of apples 
containing pesticides to be higher than the others with lower annual income. However, 
the positive sign of the income variable is statistically significant only in Model 2 (a).  
Among all of the estimated models explaining the perceptions of pesticides, 
Model 2, which pertains to the number of apples with one or more residues (a), is more 
predictive than Model 3, which pertains to the number of apples with multiple residues 
(r) (Table 6). There are various hypotheses that may explain the lower explanatory 
power of Model 3. First, this may be related to the discrepancy between valid and 
invalid probability estimates detected at the individual level for variable r, second, 
boredom and fatigue may have mattered, given that half of the sample assessed the 
variable r at the end of the experiment, while in the other half the order of questions has 
been randomized. 
In summary, the results of our econometric analysis support many of the 
predictions we had about the potential factors shaping people’s perceptions of the fire 
blight’s infestation rate and the presence of pesticide residues in apples, especially those 
related to being a farmer, having consumer association membership, having ties with 
apple industry, and the roles of the demographic variables age, and education. Even 
using our innovative risk elicitation approach here, we have several results that are quite 
consistent with previous studies that investigated the same issues with different 
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techniques. Where our results differ from the literature we believe there are plausible 
explanations of those discrepancies.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Elicited subjective risks are important because they often explain behavior under 
risk and uncertainty better than science-based risks do. These subjective estimates can 
be used in risk-oriented behavioral models that incorporate them, such as the subjective 
expected utility model, or non-expected utility models. In general, empirical results in 
previous studies have indicated that consumers have a high level of anxiety about such 
contaminants in food. Using data elicited via an indirect technique such as the 
Exchangeability Method, which we apply in an artefactual field experiment, we have 
shown that subjects are in fact not very concerned about a general increase of pesticide 
residues in apples at a key policy-related future date, but they are more concerned about 
the presence of multiple residues in apples.  
The main contribution of this paper consists of investigating the discrepancy 
between valid and invalid subjective probabilities. Our results suggest that  valid 
estimates are smaller than the invalid estimates of  the number of contaminated apples 
(variables a and r in the paper), but risk estimates are larger for the number of days in 
which the fire blight’s infestation will occur in the blossoming period (g). We note that 
such discrepancies are statistically supported only for variable r , indicating that number 
of apples that will contain multiple residues. This highlights the fact that as researchers 
and policy makers, our failure to recognize valid subjective risks might not actually 
imply an over- or underestimation of consumers’ true probability estimates, and, hence, 
affect their choice behavior. 
Our econometric analysis explores factors shaping perceptions of pesticide 
residues in apples and provides other useful information that simple ANOVA-style 
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experimental tests do not provide. For example, we found that the average apple 
consumer in our subject pool is not particularly concerned about pesticide risks; in fact 
their expectations about the presence of pesticide residues do not statistically differ 
between apple consumers and non-consumers. In contrast, members of consumers 
associations and subjects who actually work in the apple industry (excluding farmers) 
are very sensitive to the problem, as they show higher risk estimates than the others. We 
also found that young and highly educated can be expected to be more sensitive to food-
safety issues.  
Such results have quite important food safety policy implications, given the fact 
that consumers’ subjective probabilities of pesticide residues in apples might affect their 
financial support for policies which the Province of Trento is planning to promote the 
production of pesticide-free apples. For example, based on our results policy makers 
should communicate and promote their policies by highlighting the fact that these 
reduce the risk of having apples containing multiple pesticide residues if they want 
public support. In addition, food policy specialists should focus their risk 
communication campaigns towards average consumers and less educated people in the 
population.  
As a final caveat, we note that our subjects were asked to answer questions about 
risky outcomes pertaining to a future policy period, in the year 2030. It is possible that 
some subjects discount the future differently than others do, and discount rates and 
subjective risks could well be related to one another, which could affect each subject’s 
risk estimates. For example, some individuals might use higher discount rates to reflect 
their sense that the distant future is quite risky. To the extent that all subjects do this in 
our subject pool, this may not present a significant problem, but if this tendency is 
mixed among individuals, it may. In future studies, researchers should try to 
simultaneously estimate discount rates and subjective risks within the context of the EM 
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approach that we have implemented here. To our knowledge, thus far no one has 
considered the elicitation of both simultaneously within the context of the EM. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of percentile estimates  
Variable Obs. Mean Median St.Dev.   Min    Max 
g0a,d 80 6.176  5.000 4.677 1.000 29.000 
g1/4a,e
 80 7.912  6.750 5.879 0.205 29.250 
g1/2a,f
 80 9.175  7.500 6.320 0.500 29.500 
g3/4a,g
 80 10.250 9.000 6.228 0.750 29.750 
g1a,h
 80 11.925 10.500 6.072 1.000 30.000 
a0
b,d 80 56.354 60.000 20.455 4.000 90.000 
a1/4
b,e 80 65.637 68.000 21.879 5.000 96.000 
a1/2
b,f 80 69.200 72.000 21.907 6.000 98.000 
a3/4
b,g 80 71.187 74.500 21.896 8.000 99.000 
a1
b,h 80 75.450 80.000 21.706 10.000 100.000 
r0
c,d 80 31.392 32.000 16.381 4.000 82.000 
r1/4
c,e 80 42.387 38.000 19.066 5.000 90.000 
r1/2
c,f 80 44.875 41.000 18.941 6.000 92.000 
r3/4
c,g 80 47.700 43.000 19.334 8.000 93.000 
r1
c,h 80 51.825 47.000 19.241 12.000 100.000 
a
 the number of days during which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030. 
b
 the number of apples containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 
c
 the number of apples containing at least two residues in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
d the lower bound. 
e the 25th percentile. 
f the 50th percentile. 
g the 75th percentile. 
h the upper bound. 
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Table 2. Average valid and invalid percentile estimates  
Variable Valid at the 
sample level 
Invalid at the 
sample level 
Valid at the 
individual level 
Invalid at the 
individual level 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
g1/4a,d
 23 7.326 53 8.149 19 9.421 34 8.500 
g1/2a,e
 23 8.434 53 9.473 35 8.228 43 9.674 
g3/4a,f
 23 9.583 53 10.512 14 10.071 32 9.031 
Tot. 69 - 171 - 68 - 109 - 
a1/4
b,d 23 62.691 53 66.823 23 64.260 44 69.431 
a1/2
b,e 23 67.304 53 69.964 27 61.629 53 73.056 
a3/4
b,f 23 69.652 53 71.807 21 68.619 32 68.625 
Tot. 69 - 171 - 71 - 129 - 
r1/4
c,d 23 38.782 53 43.842 23 37.913 41 48.293 
r1/2
c,e 23 41.826 53 46.105 29  39.103 51 48.156 
r3/4
c,f 23 45.608 53 48.543 22 41.409 35 45.485 
Tot. 69 - 171 - 74 - 127 - 
a
 the number of days during which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030. 
b
 the number of apples containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
c
 the number of apples containing at least two residues in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
d the 25th percentile. 
e the 50th percentile. 
f the 75th percentile. 
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Table 3.  Comparison of valid and invalid percentile estimates at the sample level 
Null Hypothesis Mann-Whitney U  
Test 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  
Test 
H0 z D 
gvalid = ginvalida .819 .197 
g1/4, valid = g1/4, invalida,d .818 .197 
g1/2, valid = g1/2, invalida,e .820 .161 
g3/4, valid = g3/4, invalida,f .729 .197 
avalid = ainvalid
b 1.069 .180 
a1/4, valid = a1/4, invalid
b,d 1.069 .180 
a1/2, valid = a1/2, invalid
b,e 
.607 .167 
a3/4, valid = a3/4, invalid
b,f 
.340 .184 
rvalid = rinvalid
c 1.053 .197 
r1/4, valid = r1/4, invalid
c,d 1.058 .197 
r1/2, valid = r1/2, invalid
c,e 
.777 .141 
r3/4, valid = r3/4, invalid
c,f 
.670 .127 
a
 the number of days during which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030. 
b
 the number of apples containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
c
 the number of apples containing at least two residues in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
d the 25th percentile. 
e the 50th percentile. 
f the 75th percentile. 
* p < .01 
** p < .05 
*** p < .10  
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Table 4.  Comparison of valid and invalid percentile estimates at the individual level 
Null Hypothesis Mann-Whitney U  
Test 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  
Test 
H0 z D 
gvalid = ginvalida -.002 .069 
g1/4, valid = g1/4, invalida,d -.828 .278 
g1/2, valid = g1/2, invalida,e .962 .166 
g3/4, valid = g3/4, invalida,f -.910 .236 
avalid = ainvalid
b 1.485 .116 
a1/4, valid = a1/4, invalid
b,d 
.893 .182 
a1/2, valid = a1/2, invalid
b,e 1.632 .236 
a3/4, valid = a3/4, invalid
b,f 
.027 .122 
rvalid = rinvalid
c 
.732 .113 
r1/4, valid = r1/4, invalid
c,d 2.017** .348** 
r1/2, valid = r1/2, invalid
c,e 1.865*** .236 
r3/4, valid = r3/4, invalid
c,f 
.443 .181 
a
 the number of days during which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030. 
b
 the number of apples containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
c
 the number of apples containing at least two residues in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
d the 25th percentile. 
e the 50th percentile. 
f the 75th percentile. 
* p < .01 
** p < .05 
*** p < .10  
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Table 5. Description of variables presented in Model 1, 2, and 3 
Variable Definition Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
G_GLM Percentage of days in which the 
infestation will occur during the 
blossoming period in 2030 
.287 .453 0 1 
A_GLM Percentage of apples containing at least 
one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 
2030 
.375 .485 0 1 
R_GLM Percentage of apples containing more 
than one residue in a sample of 100 
apples in 2030 
.325 .469 0 1 
25th PERC Observations related to the 25th 
percentile of g, a, and r 
.333 .471 0 1 
50th PERC Observations related to the 50th 
percentile of g, a, and r 
.334 .471 0 1 
75th PERC Observations related to the 75th 
percentile of g, a, and r 
.333 .471 0 1 
TRS = 1 if the subject belongs to the “Real 
Incentives-Sequential Questions” 
treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.275 .446 0 1 
TRR = 1 if the subject belongs to the “Real 
Incentives-Random Questions” 
treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.287 .452 0 1 
THS = 1 if the subject belongs to the 
“Hypothetical Incentives-Sequential 
Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.237 .425 0 1 
THR = 1 if the subject belongs to the 
“Hypothetical Incentives-Random 
Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.200 .400 0 1 
IPCC_MED 
 
= 1 if the subject trusts in IPCC’s 
predictions of temperature and 
precipitation,a 
= 0 otherwise 
.012 .111 0 1 
IPCC_HIGH 
 
= 1 if the subject highly trusts in IPCC’s 
predictions of temperature and 
precipitation,a 
= 0 otherwise 
.238 .426 0 1 
IPCC_VHIGH 
 
= 1 if the subject very highly trusts in 
IPCC’s predictions of temperature and 
precipitation,a 
= 0 otherwise 
.750 .433 0 1 
CC_H&N = 1 if the subject believes that the 
climate change is due to both human 
activities and natural processes,b 
= 0 otherwise 
.600 .490 0 1 
CC_H = 1 if the subject believes that the .337 .473 0 1 
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climate change is mostly due to human 
activities,b 
= 0 otherwise 
CC_HH = 1 if the subject believes that the 
climate change is only due to human 
activities,b 
= 0 otherwise 
.062 .242 0 1 
PEST_LOW = 1 if the subject believe that farmers 
will unlikely use pesticides in the future,c 
= 0 otherwise 
.050 .218 0 1 
PEST_MED = 1 if the subject believe that farmers 
will maybe use pesticides in the future,c 
= 0 otherwise 
.200 .400 0 1 
PEST_HIGH = 1 if the subject believe that farmers 
will likely use pesticides in the future,c 
= 0 otherwise 
.537 .499 0 1 
PEST_VHIGH = 1 if the subject believe that farmers 
will very likely use pesticides in the 
future,c 
= 0 otherwise 
.213 .409 0 1 
EMF_LOW =1 if subjects little trusts EMF’s 
predictions of  fire blight’s infestation 
risk in the future,d 
= 0 otherwise 
.038 .190 0 1 
EMF_MED =1 if subjects trusts EMF’s predictions of  
fire blight’s infestation risk in the future,d 
= 0 otherwise 
.412 .493 0 1 
EMF_HIGH =1 if subjects highly trusts EMF’s 
predictions of  fire blight’s infestation 
risk in the future,d 
= 0 otherwise 
.475 .500 0 1 
EMF_VHIGH =1 if subjects very highly trusts EMF’s 
predictions of  fire blight’s infestation 
risk in the future,d 
= 0 otherwise 
.075 .263 0 1 
CONSUMER The number of apples consumed by the 
subject in a week 
3.700 5.160 0 20 
CONS_ASS = 1 if the subject is a member of a  
consumer association, 
= 0 otherwise 
.062 .242 0 1 
APP_PROD = 1 if the subject is an apple producer, 
= 0 otherwise 
.037 .190 0 1 
APP_IND = 1 if the subject is tied to apple 
processing and marketing, 
= 0 otherwise 
.187 .391 0 1 
AGE Age in years 33.625 13.213 19 68 
FEMALE = 1 if the subject is female,  
= 0 otherwise 
.436 .499 0 1 
SEC_SCHOOL = 1 if the subject has this education 
level,e 
= 0 otherwise 
.183 .389 0 1 
HIGH_SCHOOL = 1 if the subject has this education .512 .503 0 1 
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level,e 
= 0 otherwise 
UNIVERSITY = 1 if the subject has this education 
level,e 
= 0 otherwise 
.300 .465 0 1 
INCOME The yearly net income in 2010 in 
thousand € 
.189 .195 .075 .115 
a We ask subjects whether IPCC’s predictions will happen  surely, very likely,  maybe,  not likely, or 
never.     
b We ask subjects if they believe that climate change is due to, only human activity, mostly human 
activity, human activities and natural processes, mostly natural processes, and only natural processes. 
c We ask people if they agree with the statement saying that farmers mostly use chemical control 
against apple diseases, 0=strongly disagree, 1=disagree, 2=do not know, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree.  
d We ask subjects whether FEM’s predictions about fire blight will happen  surely, very likely,  
maybe,  not likely, or never. 
e 
 We ask subjects their education level, elementary school, secondary school, high school, university. 
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Table 6. Generalized Linear Model Estimation 
Variable Model 1 
(G_GLM) 
Model 2 
(A_GLM) 
Model 3 
(R_GLM) 
50th PERC .220*** .179*** .108*** 
75th PERC .395*** .283*** .231*** 
TRS .206 .369 .276 
THR -.245 .131 .051 
THS -.116 .071 .246 
IPCC_HIGH 1.261** - - 
IPCC_VHIGH 1.416*** - - 
CC_H -.181 - - 
CC_HH .860*** - - 
EMF_MED - .823 -.271 
EMF_HIGH - 1.141*** .403 
EMF_VHIGH - 2.790*** .530 
PEST_MED - .326 .472 
PEST_HIGH - .113 .336 
PEST_VHIGH - .210 .405 
APP_PROD -1.057** -.069 -1.112*** 
APP_IND .411 .848*** .902*** 
CONSUMER -.007 -.058*** -.015 
CONS_ASS -1.235*** 1.196*** 1.004*** 
FEMALE .085 .181 .054 
AGE .015* -.026** -.012* 
HIGH_SCHOOL -.809** .249 .291 
UNIVERSITY -1.373*** 0.796** .675*** 
INCOME .001 .001*** .001 
CONSTANT -2.138*** -.572 -.942 
LOG P.L.§ -99.855 -98.318 -107.073 
* p < .01, ** p < .05, *** p < .10  
§ Log Pseudo-Likelihood  
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Figure 1: An example of the binary question of the Exchangeability Method for the variable a. 
 
 
Figure 2: An example of the Certainty Equivalent Game for the variable a. 
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Figure 3: The average number of days in which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 
2030. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The average number of apples containing residues in a sample of 100 apples in 2030. 
 
 
 
